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Abstract 
We study the effect of media coverage on corporate governance outcomes by focusing on 
Russia in the period 1999-2002. Russia provides a setting with multiple examples of 
corporate governance abuses, where traditional corporate governance mechanisms are 
ineffective, and where we can identify an exogenous source of news coverage arising from 
the presence of an investment fund, the Hermitage fund, that tried to shame companies by 
exposing their abuses in the international media. We find that the probability that a 
corporate governance abuse is reversed is affected by the coverage of the news in the Anglo-
American press. The result is not due to the endogeneity of news reporting since this result 
holds even when we instrument media coverage with the presence of the Hermitage fund 
among its shareholders and the “natural” newsworthiness of the company involved.  We 
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In September 2003 Richard Grasso, the then chairman of the New York Stock 
Exchange, lost his job because his lavish compensation was exposed and vilified in the 
press. This is just one of many examples where media pressure seems to have an impact on 
corporate governance.
1 This conjecture is also supported by the evidence that countries with 
more diffuse press have better corporate governance outcomes, even when legal differences 
are accounted for (Dyck and Zingales (2002) and (2004)). Is this just a coincidence or is it 
indeed true that the press (and media in general) play an important role in corporate 
governance? If so, why is it the case? And since the media are more likely to cover a piece 
of news if they perceive it as extraordinary, can we really say that media reporting triggers a 
change of action? Or is it instead that media are more likely to report extreme episodes that 
are bound to trigger a reaction anyway?  
These are the questions we address in this paper. We start by arguing that the media 
can matter by impacting the reputation of the agents involved. Reputation is an effective 
constraint only if the audience that we care about for our reputation becomes informed. Very 
often, however, the relevant audience does not find it in its interest to collect information 
about the behavior of corporate managers and/or politicians, unless this information is 
provided them for free or it is packaged in a way that makes it entertaining. Only when this 
occurs do corporate managers find it worthwhile to develop a reputation of acting in the 
interests of shareholders. The same is true also for the regulators who are supposed to 
enforce corporate governance rules: they are more likely to enforce these rules when they 
know a large audience is watching.  
To document the empirical relevance of these effects we use Russian data, which are 
very suitable for three reasons. First, during the late 1990s corporate governance abuses in 
Russia were very extreme, very common, and very visible, providing a wide field of inquiry. 
Second, in Russia the standard mechanisms to readdress these abuses were either non-
existent or completely ineffective (for example, courts were easily corruptible), allowing us 
to identify whether media has an independent effect on outcomes.  Third, and most 
important, in Russia there exists an investment fund that consciously plays a media strategy 
                                                 
1 For a richer set of examples, see Dyck and Zingales (2002). 
        2and this allows us to identify an exogenous component in news coverage and thus to test 
whether the effect of the media is causal.   
Founded in 1996 as a generic hedge fund with a Russian focus, the Hermitage Fund 
found itself drawn into corporate governance battles. As the largest foreign investor in 
Russian equities, it could not remain passive in front of major corporate governance abuses 
(Dyck (2002)). But the legal remedies at its disposition were extremely weak. To protect its 
investments, thus, the Hermitage fund chose to actively shame Russian companies in the 
international press, hoping to hurt their reputation and that of the government officials who 
regulated these firms. But the Hermitage fund has an incentive to act only for companies it 
owns shares in. This is also borne out in the data:  companies that make significant 
corporate governance abuses are more likely to be exposed in the international press if they 
have the Hermitage fund as a shareholder. It follows that whether the Hermitage fund 
owned a stake in a company is a valid instrument for the exogenous component in news 
reporting.  
To understand the relation between the Hermitage fund and press coverage and 
between press coverage and outcomes, we start by analyzing in detail two companies -- 
Sidanco and MGTS – that committed similar corporate governance abuses in 1998, but 
differed in their owners: Hermitage had a significant stake in Sidanco, and no stake in 
MGTS.  In this case we also know from Hermitage that they got actively involved in trying 
to generate coverage.  
We find that Sidanco’s actions were reported in 23 news articles, 14 of which in 
credible international publications (9 in the Financial Times, 4 in various editions of the 
Wall Street Journal and 1 in the Economist). By contrast, MGTS had only 3 articles in 
credible international press mentioning the corporate governance violation (all in the FT).  
In the Sidanco case, the dilution was reversed, in MGTS it went through quickly. 
A single case is hardly convincing. For this reason we conduct more systematic 
analysis.  We collected all the major corporate governance abuses occurring in Russia in the 
period 1999-2002 and studied whether they were somehow readdressed. We find that the 
probability of a reversal is significantly affected by the exposure of the news in the foreign 
press, even after controlling for other potential determinants of the outcome, such as the 
degree of foreign ownership and the involvement of international organizations such as the 
        3European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). By contrast, exposure in the 
local press has no impact. Between the two main foreign newspapers, the Wall Street 
Journal seems to have more impact than the Financial Times, this could be a result of a 
higher credibility of the former or of the different importance of the two types of audiences 
these newspapers have. To separate the effect of audience from that of credibility we use a 
Russian-language publication called Vedemosti. Since this publication is a joint venture 
between the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times, it probably has credibility similar 
to that of the two owners. But being in Russian, it only reaches Russian businessmen and 
politicians. Our finding that coverage by Vedemosti has no significant effect suggests that all 
the leverage is provided by the reputation vis-à-vis the Anglo-American community.  
We also show that foreign press coverage of major corporate governance abuses is 
driven by the intrinsic newsworthiness of a company and by the presence of the Hermitage 
fund among its shareholders. We then use these two factors as instruments for foreign press 
coverage and we find that the effect of press coverage is robust, suggesting that the link is 
causal.   
Finally, we look at what is the main mechanism through which the press had an effect 
and we find that in roughly half of the cases media pressure leads a regulator or a politician 
to intervene, while in the remaining half it is the company itself that relents, realizing the 
reputational costs of continuing the battle.    
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section I outlines the theoretical 
framework. Section II explains why we focus on the Russian market.  Section III presents a 
brief case study that motivates our statistical analysis. Section IV describes our research 
design and data.  Section V presents our main results on the effect of media coverage on the 
outcome measure of whether corporate governance abuses are addressed. Section VI 
identifies some exogenous determinants of media coverage and uses these to re-estimate the 
basic regression using instrumental variables. Section VII discusses the mechanisms through 
which media affect outcomes. Section VIII concludes. 
 
I.  What role can the media play in corporate governance?  
 
I.1 The role of the media in information diffusion  
        4        5
  The role of the media is to collect, select, certify, and repackage information. In 
doing so they dramatically reduce the cost economic agents face to become informed. When 
the Wall Street Journal reports a table with the quarterly performance of mutual funds, for 
instance, an investor does not have to spend time collecting all the pieces of information 
herself, but she can glance at them in a second for the price of a dollar. Furthermore, if there 
exists a strong complementarity between news and entertainment, as it is often the case for 
hot or titillating topics, the media can make the cost of absorbing information negative by 
packaging news appropriately (Becker and Murphy (1993) and Dyck, Moss, and Zingales 
(2005)).  
  This dramatic reduction (if not elimination) of the cost of collecting information is 
very important since in many situations individual agents face a rational ignorance (Downs, 
1957) paradox: the cost of becoming informed exceeds the benefit they can personally gain 
from that information. Hence, the media have the power to overcome the “rational 
ignorance” result (Dyck, Moss, and Zingales, 2005). By doing so, the media increase the 
number of people who learn about the behavior of other people, increasing the effect of 
reputation.  In the words of Justice Brandeis: “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy 
for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric 




I.2 The role of the media in corporate governance  
  Consider a manager who has to decide whether to make a decision that might benefit 
her personally, but might hurt her reputation and trigger some legal punishment. A simple 
application of Becker (1968) model has that a manager will be dissuaded from such an 
action if and only if    
  
    (1)     Private benefit < E (Reputational cost) + E(Punishment) =   
          = * | ii
i
p RC ∑ i learns about it +  P π  
where  i RC is the reputational cost of this action vis-à-vis group i,  i p is the probability group 
i will learn about it, π is the probability of enforcement and P is the punishment in case of 
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enforcement. Note that all the terms on the right hand side are ex ante estimates. In 
particular a manager is not sure if a certain audience will learn about her decision, or how 
hard it will judge it.  
The media influence the right hand side of this equation in four ways. By publishing 
the news they can change i p , i.e., the probability that a given action is known to a certain 
audience and so it carries a reputational cost. Of course, different media have different 
audiences, so each medium has a special impact on its own audience’s i p . If, for instance, a 
company is planning to raise new finance and it cares about the capital markets’ perception 
of its own action, it will be very sensitive to coverage in outlets that are read by the financial 
market community.  
  The second way in which the media can affect the decision is by increasing the 
reputational cost  i RC . In the Grasso case, for instance, all the directors initially voted in 
favor of his lavish compensation, but when it became public many of them changed their 
position not only because the news became known to a large audience, but also because 
even the most pro-business newspapers characterized this decision in a very negative way, 
increasing their reputation cost. 
  Third, the media can have an impact by changing expected enforcement costs.  This 
comes most directly as the media influence the probability of π . The enforcer herself faces 
a trade-off (very similar to equation (1)) between personal cost of enforcement and 
reputational cost of not enforcing.  
Finally, the media can change the size of the penalty P. This is definitely the case if 
a case goes to trial, because media can impact the mood of a jury. But it is also the case 
whenever the enforcer has any discretion in the size of the punishment.  
These two latter channels suggest an interesting determinant of legal enforcement. 
The large literature on law and finance has emphasized the importance of legal enforcement 
as different from the law on the books (La Porta et al. , 1998;  Bhattacharya and Daouk, 
2002), but has not explored what drives enforcement. Our simple framework suggests that 
media pressure can play an important role in it.     
 
Which reputation?   
Starting with Fama (1980), the finance literature has recognized the importance reputation plays in disciplining corporate managers. The early literature, Fama (1980) and 
Fama and Jensen (1986), emphasized managers’ reputation vis-à-vis potential employers, 
who will determine future jobs and wage. CEOs, however, do not hop from job to job 
frequently. Especially for CEO of large companies, the probability of reentering the labor 
market (and thus the importance of their reputation vis-à-vis future employers) is minimal. 
By contrast, career concern might lead directors to act against the interest of shareholders. 
Since they are appointed by managers, they should care about their reputation vis-à-vis  
them.     
More important, instead, is the role played by a manager’s (or a company’s) 
reputation vis-à-vis financial markets, as modeled by Diamond (1989) and (1991) and 
Gomes (2000). To the extent a company needs to access financial market repeatedly, its 
reputation will affect the term of future financing. Since these terms affect the profitability 
of a company and its ability to exploit future investment opportunities, they will be 
important even for self-interested managers.    
Managers, however, seem to care not only about their reputation vis-à-vis future the 
financial market, but also vis-à-vis society at large. As we discuss in Dyck and Zingales 
(2002), managers often bow to environmental pressures not because these are in the interest 
of shareholders, but because they do not want to face the private cost of being portrayed as 
“the bad guys”.  
  
I.3  Effect on the reputation of the enforcers  
The second term on the right hand side of (1) is a function of enforcement. But what 
does drive enforcement? An enforcer compares her personal cost of acting with the 
reputational cost of not acting in a way not dissimilar from (1). As in the case of corporate 
managers, the reputational cost of not acting are affected by media reporting. The SEC, for 
example, started to ask the NYSE board about its compensation practices after the first news 
of Richard Grasso’s compensation was published in the Wall Street Journal. The 
publication of that news informed many people about the lack of activism of the SEC, 
forcing this agency to show some action.  
This effect can be driven by two separate forces. The first one is a simple extension 
of Fama’s model to politicians: they care about their future employers, i.e. the voters. The 
        7second force is the role played by the media in the battle between public interest and vested 
interests. A major reason why vested interests have so much power in political decisions is 
because of the “rational apathy” of voters (Downs, 1957). As Dyck, Moss, and Zingales 
(2005) argue, however, this rational apathy can be overturned by the media. By making 
political news entertaining, the media can overcome voters’ cost to become informed and, in 
so doing, reduce the power of vested interests. Once again Richard Grasso’s very large 
compensation became an entertaining news and made a much larger group of people aware 
of the potential conflict of interest intrinsic to the position of the NYSE chairman, who is in 
part a defender of the interests of the NYSE seat owners, and in part regulator. This new 
awareness substantially weakened the position of the NYSE lobbying effort to maintain its 
monopoly position.    
Finally, politicians do not care only about reputation vis-à-vis voters, but also their 
reputation (and their country’s reputation) vis-à-vis foreign countries. Russian President 
Putin, for example, cares also about his own reputation vis-à-vis the Western world and, in 
particular, the United States. Any news (especially if reported in the international press) that 
makes him appear weak or not in control of the situation undermines his credibility in the 
international circle. Therefore, he will be more likely to  take an action to address a problem 
if this problem is visible to the international community.    
 
I.4 When are the media most effective?  
If we look at (1) the impact of media is greater when the media reach a larger 
number of relevant groups (i.e, groups with whom managers care to maintain a good 
reputation) and when the news reporting generates a greater increase in i p . In the language 
of the media these two characteristics are diffusion and credibility. Ceteris paribus, the 
more people a medium reaches, the broader will be the reputational impact of its reports. 
Similarly, to increase in  i p , the news must come from a credible source, otherwise it is not 
believed. If we receive an e-mail coming from a unknown organization that accuses a 
famous professor of plagiarism, we are unlikely to believe it. If the same news were 
reported in the New York Times, we would be much more likely to believe it because the 
NYT has developed a good reputation (some recent incidents notwithstanding).  
Finally, the effectiveness of the media depends upon the magnitude of the 
        8reputational punishment. If the punishment occurs in the labor/product market, its 
magnitude depends upon the frequency of repeated buyers in that market and the ratio 
between future and current benefits. In a market where repeated buyers are rare, then the 
reputational penalties are limited. Similarly, if the future benefits from having a reputation 
are small (for example a company that is cashflow positive and does not expect to raise 
additional funds in the future) relative to the current benefit of deviating, then the media 
cannot have much of an effect.     
If the punishment occurs through social pressure, then its magnitude depends upon 
the strength of the social norm. For example, when a former CEO of Fiat was convicted for 
false financial reporting, the major Italian newspaper published a letter of solidarity of the 
most important business leaders. Thus, in this case the social sanction associated with the 
news appears to have been minimal, because in Italy there is not a strong social norm that 
this law should be obeyed. By contrast, in the United States there is a well-developed set of 
business publications that share the view that managers should maximize shareholders’ 
value. Hence, executives fear being exposed as villains in these publications. Hence, the 
media can only be as affective as the moral norms shared by a certain community and its 
media.
3
Many of these factors suggest that when we examine governance violations in 
Russia, as we will do shortly, we have to distinguish between three categories. Russian 
media in Russian, which have access to the Russian public but have limited credibility; 
foreign-owned media in Russia, which have access to the Russian public but enjoy greter 
credibility; Anglo-American media, which has access to the international centers of 
economic and political power, where English is the lingua franca, and enjoy of great 
credibility.  
Russians might care about their reputation vis-à-vis the international community for 
two reasons. First, they might want to access international markets (for financing, joint 
ventures, and even sale contracts). Second, for personal satisfaction. After becoming rich 
executives in many developing countries seek broader acceptance in the international 
community by joining the World Economic Forum at Davos, seeking positions on the 
                                                 
3 Business publications, for instance, are more powerful in shaping the reputation of an executive than non-business press 
because they are more effective in reaching business people who will interact with him/her in the future. 
        9boards of trustees of prominent international institutions, and so on.  
Negative news reported in international media can have the effect of ostracizing the 
executives from these desired social circles. While the Russian oligarch Vladimir Potanin 
was successful in his efforts to join the trustees of the Guggenheim Museum in April 2002, 
oligarchs such as Oleg Deripaska were “disinvited” from participating in the Davos 
meeting, and Deripaska was stripped of his designation as “one of the global leaders of 
tomorrow” following negative press coverage of civil lawsuits alleging bribery, money 




II. The Russian Case  
  
II.1 Why Russia?  
  If enforcement is very effective and/or legal punishments are extremely severe, the 
manager’s expected cost of violating minority shareholders’ rights is such that managers 
will never do so. For this reason, it would be helpless to try to identify any effect of the 
media in a country with very effective corporate governance rules.  
The same is true, however, if the media have a long established track record to 
castigate managers with a poor corporate governance record. Managers will be so scared of 
the reputational penalties that will abstain from committing any abuse.   
Ideally, thus, we would need a country that has very little or no legal enforcement 
and where, at the time a decision is made, the reputational costs of a decision are not well 
understood by the decision maker.  
Russia during the period late 1990s-early 2002 scores “well” on both dimensions.  
During this period the standard instruments to readdress corporate abuses were either non- 
existent (derivative suits) or completely ineffective (for example, courts were easily 
corruptible). As a result, corporate governance abuses were very extreme, very common, 
and very visible. Hence, we can relatively easily assemble a sample of objective bad 
governance decisions and follow them over time.  
                                                 
4 One way to reconcile this effect with the traditional reputation effect is to posit that every manager has the option to start 
a political career and, thus, she cares about her general reputation. But since a political career is not a source of large 
monetary gains, the existence of such an interest can be justified only with an extra term in the utility function. It is 
simpler, then, to posit from the beginning that managers care about their reputation in this broader sense.       
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press, in particular with the foreign press. Having being raised in an environment (Soviet 
Russia) where the media were reporting only what the party establishment wanted, they 
were unlikely to factor in their decisions the reputation loss some media could inflict.  
In addition to these two factors, Russia is the ideal laboratory environment because there 
exists a fund that consciously plays a media strategy: the Hermitage Fund   (Dyck (2002)).   
 
II. 2  The Hermitage strategy  
Founded in 1996 as a generic hedge fund with a Russian focus, the Hermitage Fund 
changed its strategy and focus after the 1998 Russian crisis. In the words of its chairman:     
 
Our basic approach is to thoroughly research and understand where the corporate 
malfeasance is taking place and then go to great pains to simplify the story so the average 
person can understand what is going on. One of the reasons that certain companies have 
gotten away with various abuses in the past is that no one really understood what was 
happening because the stories were so complicated. We then share the stories with the 
press.  By doing so, we want to inflict real consequences – business, reputational and 
financial. 
A lot of our value is communication – packaging what happens in a clear way. Fund 
managers have little training in this.  I couldn’t get investors riled up unless I could 
package the story. Here is where my BCG training was helpful. You have to understand 
that the press doesn’t know about the stories, have the ability to understand some of these 
complicated activities, or can’t afford to do research.  We have a lot of money invested.  
We are affected.  We can devote the resources to do what it takes to truly understand 
what is going on.  Our goal is to frame the issue so that it is clear to everyone what has 
happened.  We do talk to the Russian press, but our focus is on the international press. 
(Dyck, 2002).  
 
Since the Hermitage fund tries to generate more coverage only for companies it owns shares 
in, the presence of the Hermitage fund among the shareholders of a company should 
represent an exogenous shift in news coverage, which can be used to identify the causal 
mechanism between news coverage and governance outcomes. 
 
II.3 How Does Hermitage Generate News? 
 
Being a Helpful Source  
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present and document this information to a select group of reporters.  Becoming a source for 
information has the immediate effect of providing the specific news Hermitage wants to 
present and determining the time of the release of the news. 
To illustrate the impact of Hermitage on news coverage, consider the coverage of 
corporate governance violations at Gazprom, Russia’s largest company.  There had been 
widespread concerns about deals between related parties.  But this only became a focus of 
attention, and was only addressed seriously, when Hermitage made this a focus of a media 
campaign.  One mechanism whereby Hermitage claims it generates news is to conduct 
research and then present and document this information to a select group of reporters.  This 
occurred in fall of 2000, as reported by Bill Browder, head of the Hermitage fund,  
As Bill Browder described it, 
My head of research was able to buy the entire Moscow registration database 
from a hawker on a street corner. With the securities commission database, we 
knew the names of the companies that stole assets from Gazprom, and with the 
registration chamber data, we knew which individuals owned the companies. 
From that we were able to piece together exactly how much was stolen and by 
which members of management. … [We] decided to share our findings with 
the world by selectively releasing different examples of the graft to the major 
Western newspapers in Moscow. 
 
By October of 2000, Hermitage had put this information together in a 41 page 
powerpoint presentation that laid out the story they want told, and presented the underlying 
information including the sources for this information.   As Table 1 shows, there is a clear 
overlap between their information and resulting stories, more evident in the Financial Times 
than the Wall Street Journal reporting. 
Not only did Browder present new information, they also worked hard to time the 
presentation of information, and to ensure continued coverage of stories they cared about.  
Originally, we would give one reporter the whole story.  They would want to 
check every bit of it out, get the other side’s point of view, or ignore it, 
seeing this as too complicated and time consuming to pursue. Now we give a 
small piece of the story to a journalist and let them know that we’ll give it to 
someone else in three days if they don’t write anything. It seems that 
journalists are more concerned about losing the story to a competitor than 
almost anything else.  
 
        12Suggestive of the success of this strategy, we also see continued coverage of these 
allegations in the international news, as well as successful outcomes, with concrete steps to 
limit such dilutions of Gazprom, including new requirements for board approval, new audits 
of these related party transactions, and the removal of the chief executive at the center of 
these allegations.  Panel B of Table1 provides a timeline of these outcomes, as well as 
importantly showing that this story, like so many other allegations of shareholder abuse in 
Russia, did not die, but rather was repeated again and again over the next 6 months.  
Interestingly this is a much more prominent issue in the Financial Times, which relied more 
heavily upon this source, than in the Wall Street Journal. 
 
Becoming news 
Another channel through which Hermitage generates news is by becoming news.  
One illustration of this effect is the use of lawsuits filed by the company.  Hermitage has 
found that by filing lawsuits, this generates news that repeats their allegations.  As Bill 
Browder argues, 
We also go to courts.  We’ve been involved in 32 lawsuits.  And we win in 
terms of public attention regardless of the outcome, where we’ve lost 31 
times.  I think the proportion of number of words written in the press when a 
lawsuit is initiated to when it is dismissed is 50 to 1. The court of public 
opinion is much more effective than the Russian legal system and much 
fairer. 
The case of Sberbank illustrates this channel.  The Sberbank board announced plans 
to go forward with a new share issue that would dilute stakes of existing shareholders.  
Ordinary shareholder methods to fight this decision would be ineffective as there were no 
representatives of minority shareholders on the board.  To generate continued coverage of 
this event, Hermitage launched 12 different lawsuits against Sberbank and the Central Bank, 
losing every one of them.  Although the lawsuits were all dismissed, the lawsuits generated 
a large amount of publicity, which came at a time when the Russian Duma was debating a 
new law on investor protection.   
 
III.  Case Study  
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outcomes and the mechanisms through which this causal link operates, we introduce a small 
case study. We chose two companies whose corporate governance abuses predate our 
sample period: Sidanco (a little known but important holding company in the oil and gas 
sector) and MGTS (the Telecom company for Moscow).  
In both of these companies, insiders attempted to dilute other shareholders by issuing 
shares well below the prevailing market price to parties linked with insiders. Sidanco 
announced a convertible bond issue at a 95 percent discount to the market price in 
December 1997.
5  MGTS proposed to issue shares to the Moscow city government for par 
value of $0.17 per share (one rouble), almost nothing next to the prevailing market price of 
$900 per share, in January 1998.  Not surprisingly, in both of these companies the share 
price plummeted on news of the dilution, with an approximate 66% and 50% loss around the 
event for Sidanco and MGTS.   
Despite these similarities, the coverage of the two events was dramatically different. 
The Sidanco case generated significant coverage in the international business press (which 
Factiva defines to include the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal, the New York 
Times, and the business weeklies of Business Week and Fortune).
6   By contrast, in the 
MGTS case, there was very little coverage, with only 3 stories in the credible international 
press, and one of these stories focusing more on Sidanco than MGTS. 
The extent of news coverage could simply reveal that some events are more 
interesting for the press or that there is greater fundamental interest for some companies.  
We address this concern in a number of ways.  First, we note that by design we have chosen 
very ‘similar’ events, both being significant dilutions initiated around the same point in 
time, and that both companies have foreign ownership, with MGTS having a higher 
proportion of foreign shareholders.  Second, and more importantly, to investigate the 
possibility of differences in newsworthiness, we collected information on the coverage of 
the respective companies in the wire stories around the same time.  Wire stories tend to 
                                                 
5 The Payment for the convertible bonds was expected to be made through the swap of shares in 7 daughter 
companies for the convertible bonds.  The calculation in the text assumes that these shares in daughter 
companies were valued based on their price on the exchange on July 29, 1998.  The discount would be close to 
98% if instead the price used was the price per share BP paid in December of 1997 of $25 per share. 
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would predict more coverage of MGTS for we have more than 50 wire stories, whereas only 
7 stories about Sidanco.  
Finally, we have additional evidence that the news was generated to raise 
reputational penalties, and that the news coverage helped to produce the outcomes we 
observe.  This evidence comes from the fact that Hermitage had a sizable stake in Sidanco 
and not in MGTS, and that Hermitage had a determined and concerted policy to use the 
press to protect their interests.
7  
William Browder, manager of Hermitage describes the events leading up to this 
media strategy and how it was conducted: 
I arranged a meeting with an investment banker from Renaissance Capital, 
their investment bank, and was told, “We’re going to dilute you, and there is 
nothing you can do about it.”  I said, you don’t understand, I’m going to have 
to fight you, which didn’t scare them at all.  I didn’t want to have any 
conflicts, but at the same time I was about to lose $60 million of my 
investors’ money. I called my partner, Edmond Safra, and said I didn’t think 
we have any choice, I suggested that we had to go to war.  Safra backed me 
100%.  I hired bodyguards and went to work. (Dyck (2002)) 
Browder tried to use whatever leverage he could over the controlling shareholder 
group.  He did not go on the legal offensive immediately because he did not think that 
would work, given the impotence of the security regulator and the corruption in the courts.  
Instead, “We set out to shame those who had anything to do with the controlling group, to 
tell their agents to stop doing this.” Browder contacted BP and the Harvard University 
endowment, Unifund.  Safra personally called up financier George Soros.  And Browder 
contacted reporters, being careful to focus on reporters from credible and influential 
Western papers such as The Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal. Since 
Uneximbank and Renaissance Capital were involved in capital markets, there was a variety 
of potential pressure points.
8
                                                                                                                                                      
6 It is possible to use this larger set of papers in this individual case study, but time and resource limitations 
required us to limit our news outlets to just the Financial Times and  the Wall Street Journal for our larger 
sample. 
7 Hermitage had invested early in 1996, spending roughly $12 million to buy 4 million shares at $3 a share, a 
2% stake.  At the same time, allies held another 2%, with the remainder held by a controlling group headed by 
Uneximbank (controlled by Russian oligarch Potanin) and Renaissance Capital.   
8 “Certainly, Mr. Potanin, whose Uneximbank controls Sidanco, is keen to bring western partners into his 
business empire and is therefore sensitive to criticism from foreign investors such as Mr. Soros, a co-investor 
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9, readers of The Financial Times found reported on the front page that “BP said it was 
coming under ‘moral pressure’ from minority investors in Russian oil group Sidanco to 
intervene in a row over shareholder rights.”  On the 10
th, the LEX column in the paper 
suggested that BP “should use its forthcoming seat on the Sidanco board to improve 
corporate governance.”   
As Browder recalled, “This caught management’s attention and Boris Jordan’s, the 
CEO of Renaissance Capital. The next day Boris Jordan called me and said, ‘You’re not 
playing by the rules, Bill.’”  The response to the story was for Uneximbank and Jordan to go 
on the offensive.  They wrote a letter to Safra complaining about Browder.  They organized 
their own press conference to respond.  As The Wall Street Journal reported, “Hermitage 
was notified of the precise terms of the bond issue before it bought Sidanco shares.”  
Browder saw these efforts as benefiting him, by keeping the story alive and generating more 
reputational penalties. 
The media campaign helped with Browder’s legal strategy.  Dimitri Vasiliev, head 
of the Russian securities regulator (FSRC), was now interested in the case.  So the chief 
counsel of Republic National Bank came to Moscow and with a team of foreign and Russian 
lawyers wrote a brief to the securities commissioner. In two weeks, by February 26, the 




The reason he made this decision is that I was screaming bloody murder.  He 
had a great scandal on his hands. Nobody had ever taken such a visible and 
outspoken position.  I was shooting from the trenches, and this gave him 
cover to take his own steps.  You have to remember that, as has become 
clearer since then, oligarchs owned the government and Vasiliev was worried 
about terrible things happening to him, professionally or even worse.
10 By 
not initiating but responding to an attack, he felt more empowered to act.  He 
                                                                                                                                                      
in Svyazinvest,” reported The Financial Times (“Fighting with Sword and Shield,” Financial Times (London), 
Survey Edition 1, April 15, 1998, p. 4). 
9 “The toothless Federal Securities Commission has launched an investigation, but few expect it to force 
Sidanco to change its attitude to small shareholders.  The problem is not that laws to protect minority investors 
have not been passed in Russia but that the will to enforce them is weak,” reported The Financial Times 
(“Russian Equities—the LEX column,” February 10, 1998, p. 14).   
10 Vasiliev resigned from FSCR in October 1999 complaining about a lack of support to address governance 
abuses. 
        16asked us on a number of occasions to raise specific points in the press 
because he couldn’t go on the offensive until something came out publicly.  
He was clear that he couldn’t be seen as initiating but responding. 
 
 
Consistent with our hypothesis, the final outcomes differed dramatically in the two cases.  
Sidanco canceled the dilutive issue and its shareholders recovered some of their losses, 
while MGTS went through with its issue. 
 
IV.    Data Description 
 
The case presented above is just an example, with all the limitations an example has. 
We now try to address the same problem in a more systematic way.  
  
IV.1 The  Sample 
Ideally, we would like a complete sample of corporate governance abuses during a 
certain period. Fortunately, between 1998 and 2002 Troika Dialog, the most prominent 
Russian investment bank, published the “Bulletin on Corporate Governance Actions.” In 
this bulletin, specialists at Troika provided a one to three paragraph description of corporate 
actions that came to their attention over the previous week.   
We read all sections in each issue between December 1998 until June 2002 (when 
this publication was ceased) and identified an initial sample of potential governance 
violations.  This sample was based primarily on all the events reported in a sub-section titled 
“Reported Governance Violations”, as well as events in other sub-sections such as “New 
Share Issues/Conversions” where the paragraph description raised concerns that the 
proposed action was prejudicial to the rights of shareholders or creditors. This search 
resulted in a sample of 407 events involving 141 companies. After dropping events that 
update previously reported governance abuses (157) we are left with an initial sample of 250 
unique events.  
We then read the English and Russian press to learn more about these events.  We 
first used this information to more accurately date the first announcement of the event.  
When we found an earlier news report than the weekly Troika report date, we changed the 
date.  We also used these additional news searches to refine our sample so that we were 
        17focusing only on events that identified new evidence of actions that had the potential to 
significantly harm the interests of minority shareholders, and where the proposed action 
could, in principle, be limited through actions by minority shareholders and allies.  
Specifically, we used this additional qualitative information to eliminate those events where 
one or more of the following applied: (a) we could not clearly identify that the action was 
prejudicial to minority shareholders (131 events), (b) there was no feasible redress that 
could be introduced by shareholders so we could not code an outcome (54 events), (c) there 
was confounding information at the same time as the governance violation, making share 
price an unreliable indicator of governance abuses (8 events). After this screening we are 
left with a final sample of 57 events. Only for 24 of these events do we have reliable stock 
price information (i.e., price associated with some positive volume) from Datastream. 
Across the 57 events we see at least five different methods whereby insiders 
expropriate minority shareholders.  One method (e.g. Sberbank) involves dilutive share 
issues where new shares are issued and insiders find ways to dramatically increase their 
stakes, often through closed subscriptions at discounts to the market price.  A second 
method (e.g. Norilsk Nickel, Surgutneftegaz) consists in a share swap between companies 
and subsidiaries on terms that are viewed as hurting the interests of minority shareholders.   
A third method (e.g AvtoVAZ, UES) involves a reorganization of the firm and its 
subsidiaries that provides increased scope for self-dealing transactions. A fourth method 
involves debt holders using bankruptcy proceedings to reallocate assets to themselves, and 
in so doing diluting minority investors (Chernorgorneft, KamAZ).  A fifth method involves 
selling assets or business opportunities to companies closely affiliated with management 
(e.g. Gazprom).   
For the 24 events for which we have a reliable stock price, we confirm the 
correctness of our assessment of the events by looking at the stock price reaction. As a 
measure of the short-run impact we use the cumulative excess return from ten days before 
the event to three days after. We use a longer-than-usual window because of the possibility 
of information leakage and trading before the events (Bhattacharya et al., 2000). To the 
extent that the corporate violation is a surprise, it should have a negative impact on stock 
prices.  Table 3, column 4 describes how the market responded to these events using this 
        18metric.  As expected the response was overwhelmingly negative, with a mean decline in 
cumulative excess returns of 15.3 percent. 
 
IV.2 Performance  Measures 
To measure the impact of media pressure on the ability to contain or overturn the 
corporate decisions that violated minority shareholders’ rights we look at the actual 
outcomes.  After reading the Russian and the English Language press over the subsequent 
year, we coded an outcome as 0 if the violation went through as planned and there were no 
subsequent changes in the firm linked to the (possible) furor surrounding this event.  We 
coded an outcome as 2 if the violation led to a significant response in the firm, including 
undoing of the event, significant change in the terms of the transaction, a structural change 
that makes further such actions unlikely (e.g. change in CEO, change in charter, change in 
number of independent board members, change in national law).  We code an outcome as 1 
if there is a partial redress of the shareholder concerns.  There was a positive outcome of 
significant redress or partial redress in 17 of these 57 cases. 
We thought to use, but later discarded the idea of using, the long-term performance 
of the stock price as a measure of the outcome. First, the paucity of actively traded 
companies dramatically reduce the sample. Second, the timing of the possible reversal 
(stretching over months) make it difficult to identify outperformance, especially in an 
environment , such as the Russian one, characterized by high volatility in stock prices. Last 
but not least, if the market is so rational to anticipate the impact of media, the stock price 
performance will underestimate their effect.  
 
IV.3 News  Measures 
  Table 4 reports the news coverage of the 57 companies in our sample, before, at the 
time, and after the corporate governance abuse. We measure the coverage in both the 
Russian-language and foreign-language press.  For the Russian-language press we focus on 
three large and/or prominent newspapers:  Kommersant, Izvestia, and Vedemosti.  For the 
English language news we focus on the Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal as 
credible western news outlets.  We measure short-run news coverage of the violation in a 
window surrounding the announcement of the event (t-1 to t+2 months), and longer-run 
        19news coverage in a longer window (t+2 to t+6 months).  For the most part we focus on the 
combined coverage in the English (Russian) press, although we also break down coverage 
by publication. 
One factor that determines the volume of news about a company is the intrinsic 
interest this company generates in the press. As a measure of intrinsic ‘newsworthiness’ we 
count the number of references to this company in the 6 month period from January to end 
of June 1998, a time preceding our sample period and prior to the unique period surrounding 
the Russian default.  We present this data in column 11 and 12 of Table 4.  
 
IV.4  Reputation measures 
  Since in Russia all legal remedies are very weak and the large shareholders are 
widely considered the villains rather than the monitors, the only source of restraint is given 
by the reputation these companies have vis-à-vis foreign investors. We try to capture 
reputation concerns through three proxies: the percentage of foreign ownership, the presence 
of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) among the company’s 
lenders, and the number of joint ventures between a company and foreign partners, 
computed as the sum of the number of existing joint ventures with foreign companies at the 
time of the event and the ones that are completed in the year following the revelation of the 
corporate governance violation. This variable may suffer of a reverse causality problem 
(only if the corporate governance violation was readdressed the joint venture is signed), but 
dropping it only strengthens our results, so we conservatively keep it in. All these variables 
are reported in Table 5, while Table 6 presents the summary statistics of the variables used 
in the subsequent regression. 
 
V. The Effect of Media on Outcomes  
  
The first question we try to address is whether press coverage has any impact on the 
probability that a corporate governance violation is partially or completely addressed.     
  In Table 7A (column 1) we present our basic specification. In a country where legal 
remedies are not available, the only source of leverage against these violations is 
international reputation, which we try to capture through our three proxies. Since our 
dependent variable is the outcome (which can be either two, or one, or zero) we run an 
        20ordered logit. Of our three reputation proxies, only the presence of the EBRD as a creditor 
seems to have a significant impact on outcome. The presence of EBRD among the creditors 
increases the probability of full redress (outcome =2) by 18 percentage points.  Also the 
number of joint ventures has a positive effect on outcomes, but it is not statistically 
significant. Surprisingly, the effect of foreign ownership is negative, but is not statistically 
significant. 
  To this basic specification, in column 2 of Table 7A, we add a measure of foreign 
press coverage (number of articles published in the FT and WSJ in the two months 
following the event). As we expected, press coverage has a positive and statistically 
significant effect. One standard deviation increase in the number of articles published in 
foreign newspapers increases the probability of full redress (outcome =2) by 10 percentage 
points.  Interestingly, now the percentage of foreign ownership not only has a negative sign, 
but it is also statistically significant. Since foreign ownership is positively correlated with 
coverage by foreign media, these estimates seem to suggest that if not for the impact of 
foreign media, companies owned by foreigner are less likely to readdress the corporate 
governance abuse they perpetrated.   
  Columns 3-4 of Table 7A test the robustness of this result to different measures of 
press coverage. In column III we use a shorter window (only one month after the event), 
while in columns IV and V we use longer windows (from one to six months and from two to 
six months).  The results are very consistent. The coefficients are smaller for the longer 
windows, but also the average number of articles is bigger. Hence, to assess the overall 
impact we need to calculate the economic impact of a one standard deviation increase in the 
number of articles in the two periods. It turns out that a one standard deviation increase in 
the number of later articles increases the probability of a good outcome by only 7 
percentage points. Hence, earlier articles matter more.  
  Since the distinction between partial redress and full redress is subjective and hence 
questionable, in the last column of Table 7A we code all positive outcomes as 1 and 
estimate a logit model of the probability that the corporate governance abuse be redressed in 
any way. The effects are similar to the ones obtained before.  
        21  In Table 7B we try to probe deeper into which articles are more important for a 
positive outcome. Column 1 simply reports the results of column II in Table 7A for 
comparison purposes.   
Column 2 inserts as an additional explanatory variable the coverage in Russian 
newspapers. The effect is negative but economically and statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. By contrast, the effect of the Anglo-American press coverage is virtually unchanged.  
  Column 3 decomposes the effect of foreign press coverage between the Financial 
Times and the Wall Street Journal. The coefficient of the WSJ is seven times bigger than 
that of the FT and it is statistically different from zero (unlike the FT’s one). Even 
correcting for the higher mean and standard deviation of FT articles, the WSJ has more 
impact: one standard deviation increase in the number of WSJ articles increases the 
probability of a good outcome by 10 percentage points versus 1 percentage point of FT 
articles.  
One of the Russian newspapers, Vedemosti, is a joint venture between the Financial 
Times and the Wall Street Journal. As such, it should enjoy a reputation similar to that of its 
two owners. On the other hand, by being in Russian, it only circulates in Russian. This 
allows us to distinguish whether the difference in the impact of Anglo-American 
newspapers and Russian ones is due to differences in their credibility or in the audiences 
they have access to.  
In Table 7C (column I) we re-estimate the basic specification using, as a measure of 
press coverage, just the number of articles in Vedemosti. The coefficient has a positive sign, 
but it is not statistically significant. The same occurs in column II, where we control also for 
the coverage in other Russian newspapers. In fact, the coefficient on Vedemosti is almost 
numerically identical to the one of the other, less credible, Russian newspapers. Hence, 
keeping the audience constant, differences in credibility do not seem to have a major effect. 
Finally, in column III we insert also the coverage in Anglo-American newspapers. While the 
coefficient on Anglo-American newspapers is positive as significant, the coefficient on 
Vedemosti coverage turns negative (albeit insignificant).  
In sum, newspapers in Russian, even when credible, do not seem to play much of a 
role. Hence, we have to infer –consistent with the views of Hermitage’s chairman-- that the 
main source of leverage is the access to an international audience.     
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VI. Addressing the causality problem   
 
VI.1  What Determines News 
  There is a potential objection to the results presented in Table 7: more severe abuses 
are likely to trigger more news stories. If it is also true that more severe abuses are more 
likely to be redressed, then our result may be spurious.  
To confront this potential criticism in Table 8 we try to determine what drives press 
coverage. As a dependent variable we use the number of articles that appeared in the FT and 
WSJ during different event windows. Columns I and II focus on the shorter window (- 1 
month, +2 months).  Columns III, IV, and V on longer windows, while columns VI and VII 
break down the articles between the Wall Street Journal and the FT.  
To explain a company’s coverage by Anglo-American newspapers we need to 
capture the intrinsic interest Anglo-American readers have for these companies. Oil 
companies, for example, attract much more interest than domestic car manufacturers. 
Similarly, larger companies tend to have more following than small ones. To capture this 
level of “newsworthiness” we compute the number of articles present in the foreign press 
during a quiet period before the Russian crisis (i.e., between January first and June 30 of 
1998). A second potential driver of coverage in the FT and WSJ is the percentage of a 
company owned by foreigners.  
In column 1, we regress coverage at the time of the events on these two factors. As 
expected, newsworthiness has a positive statistically significant impact on coverage. A one 
standard deviation increase in newsworthiness more than doubles the number of articles 
appearing at the time of the corporate governance violation. The percentage of foreign 
ownership also has a positive impact on coverage, but this impact is not statistically 
different from zero.  
In column 2 of Table 8 we add to this basic specification a dummy variable equal to 
one if the Hermitage fund had a stake in the company at the end of 1998. If our conjecture 
(and the claims of the Hermitage Fund chairman) is correct, the level of coverage should be 
higher when the Hermitage Fund owned a stake, because it has an incentive to intervene and 
prompt journalists to write stories. The Hermitage dummy enters in a positive way and it is 
        23statistically significant at the 1% level. The presence of Hermitage among the shareholders 
increases the number of articles by 2.3 units, more than tripling the average coverage. 
  In columns 3-5 we test the robustness of the “Hermitage effect” to different 
measures of press coverage. The effect appears quantitatively bigger when we measure 
coverage over longer event windows. If we measure the impact relative to the total number 
of article, however, the effect is rather constant: the presence of the Hermitage fund among 
the shareholder of a company triples the number of articles it receives in the Anglo 
American press when a corporate governance violation takes place. So the Hermitage fund 
is not only effective in planting the news, but also in sustaining the foreign press interest. 
We will return on this topic later.  
  Finally, in columns 6 and 8 we test whether the Hermitage has more of an effect on 
the WSJ or on the FT. The estimate of the impact of the Hermitage on the FT is twice as 
large as the one on the WSJ, but – given the paucity of data—this difference is not 
statistically significant.  
  One shortcoming of these estimates is that we are unable to control for the 
importance of the news. Theoretically, it is possible that more “newsworthy” companies or 
companies where Hermitage fund was invested experience more significant corporate 
governance violations. If this is the case, the estimate effect is spurious. While we cannot 
address this problem for the whole sample, we can for the subsample for which we have 
reliable stock price data. The announcement return at the time the corporate governance 
abuse is announced is a pretty good measure of the magnitude of the news. In Table 8B, we 
re-estimate all the specification estimated in Table 8A on this reduced sample and we can 
control for the announcement return. The coefficients of both newsworthiness and the 
Hermitage dummy are virtually unchanged, suggesting the estimated effect is not spurious.     
 
VI.2  Instrumental variable estimation  
Having identified some exogenous determinants of press coverage, we can now 
verify whether the effect of coverage on outcome is spurious or not by using these 
exogenous factors as instruments. Before doing so, however, we need to ascertain that these 
have sufficient explanatory power, i.e. technically are not “weak”. This is done in the last 
row of Table 8, where we test the exclusion restrictions for the two instruments. In all the 
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instruments, the F-test is 19.     
Hence, we can use these two variables as instruments for news coverage. This is 
what we do in Table 9. For comparability reasons, in column 1 we reproduce the estimate of 
the basic specification using OLS. In column 2 we instrument foreign press coverage with 
newsworthiness and the presence of the Hermitage fund. The IV estimates are almost 
identical to the OLS ones, suggesting that the reverse causality is not a major issue.     
One possible objection is that while we have a convincing case for the exogeneity of 
one instrument (the presence of the Hermitage fund), we do not have it for the other. 
Fortunately, we can test for it by using the Hausamn test. Under the assumption that A 
newsworthiness is exogenous both the IV estimates with one instrument and with two are 
consistent. But under the alternative, only the estimate obtained with one instrument (the 
presence of Hermitage) is consistent. The p-value of the Huasman test is 0.54, hence we 
cannot reject the hypothesis of exogeneity of both instruments.   
 
VII. How press coverage leads to better outcomes?    
 
The question we have not addressed yet is how press coverage succeeds in changing 
outcomes. In the Gazprom example the coverage given to the corporate governance 
violation had several effects. First, the government officials on the Gazprom board felt 
compelled to side with minority shareholders and pass a motion that required board 
approval for any subsequent dilutions.  Publication of this news also helped coordinate the 
actions of small institutional shareholders, who demanded an audit of these transactions.  
These stories inflamed the investment community and helped Hermitage to convince other 
investors to sign their proxies to get the necessary 10% required to demand an independent 
audit of these and other transactions in December of 2000. The revelations also provided 
additional motivation for the government to change the CEO of Gazprom in May of 2001. 
  As this example illustrates, the mechanism through which media coverage affect 
outcomes is very complex. It is difficult to identify one single force. All the factors that 
played a role in the Gazprom case seem to have gained strength as a result of news 
        25coverage. Nevertheless, we can say that in this Gazprom case the final difference was made 
by a political intervention.  
With this logic (and caveat) in table 10 we try to group the positive outcomes 
according to the main force behind reversal. Roughly 30% of the cases reach a (at least 
partially) positive outcome as a result of the intervention of a regulator. What does press 
coverage have to do with the decision of a regulator to intervene? By overcoming Downs’ 
(1956) rational ignorance result, press coverage makes more people aware of the issues 
involved, increasing the reputation costs of non acting (Dyck, Moss, and Zingales, (2005)).  
Another 18% of the cases get resolved because of political intervention. If Russia 
were a typical democracy the reasoning would be very similar. Politicians feel compel to 
intervene on issues that are highly visible, because their political reputation is on the line. 
Being Russia (and being press coverage in a language not read by most of the voters), the 
reasoning might be different. The important factor here is the reputation vis-à-vis foreign 
(and in particular Anglo-American) investors. Albeit his reputation vis-à-vis the Western 
world, it is not Putin’s only concern, it did play a role. In the case of UES, for instance, 
Putin took advantage of the foreign press to reduce the power of his political challenger, 
Anatoli Chubais. Had foreign media not attacked Chubais, Putin might have been more 
reluctant to intervene for fear of the repercussions his actions might have on his reputation 
in the West. The negative press campaign on Chubais allowed Putin to kill two birds with 
one stone: reduce the power of his political challenger and enhance his reputation in the 
West.  
In another 24% of the cases, a more positive resolution is due to the fact that press 
coverage strengthened the existing opposition. For example, in the Kamaz case, the EBRD 
was fighting the share dilution approved by the company. Press coverage strengthened the 
EBRD case because it increased the awareness of investors as to the behavior of Kamaz and 
in so doing increased the reputation cost of misbehavior.  
In the remaining 24% of the cases, it looks like the company voluntarily changed its 
course of actions. In these cases it is more difficult to establish what role did press coverage 
play.           
 In sum, it looks like the primary mechanism through which media coverage has an 
effect is by increasing the reputation cost of misbehavior vis-à-vis a relevant audience (in 
        26this case Anglo-American investors). Obviously, the success of this strategy is highly 
dependent on the importance the key actors attribute to their reputation vis-à-vis this 
constituency.  Thus, our findings might be contingent to the particular period Russia was 
living shortly after the default on its public debt, when it was particularly concerned of 
restoring its international credibility.  
If this result is confirmed by future studies, it has very important policy 
consequences. It means that by interacting with developing countries the United States can 
exert a very positive influence not only in public governance, but only in corporate 
governance. Since politicians and businessmen are eager to “look good” in the face of the 
Anglo-American public opinion, they can be levered into improving their governance 
standards.   
 
VII. Conclusions  
 
 
  In this paper we argue that press coverage can be an important source of pressure to 
redress corporate governance abuses. We show this relationship to be present in Russia, 
even when we instrument for the level of press coverage with its exogenous determinants.  
  Two important questions remain open. First, what is the degree of complementarity 
between media pressure and other—more traditional—corporate governance mechanisms. 
Since other mechanisms are almost completely ineffective in Russia, this question will have 
to be addressed using a different sample.  
  Second, our finding that media coverage is important and can be effectively 
manipulated by the parties involved raises the question of how widespread manipulation is 
and what are its welfare consequences.    
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        29Table 1:   How Does Hermitage Generate News? 
 
Panel A - Generating Initial News 
 
Below we present slides from a 41 slide Hermitage powerpoint presentation produced in early 2000 that 
detailed a series of self-dealing actions by company management involving Stroytransgaz, Itera, Rospan, 
Zapsibgazprom and other entities.  This information was provided to journalists at the Financial Times and 
Wall Street Journal.  We follow the slides with newspaper coverage in the Financial Times and the Wall Street 
Journal that picks up on this news. 
    
5
DRAFT Stroytransgaz: a family affair  
Who owns Stroytransgaz? 
57.04%
Source: Stroytransgaz securities market reports, Gazprom, Stroytransgaz securities market reports.
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Financial Times reporting, October 25, 2000 
 
“The FT has learned of one case in which Gazprom has been awarding large contracts to a company which is 
majority owned by the relatives of Gazprom’s past and present management. Stroytransgaz documents from 
1999 show that over 50 percent of the pipeline construction company is owned by people close to Gazprom’s 
senior management.  These include 6 per cent each by Vitaly and Andrei Chernomyrdin, the sons of the former 
prime minister, and former head of Gazprom Viktor Chernomyrdin, and a further 6.4 per cent by Tatyana 
Dedikova, the daughter of Gazprom’s chief executive Rem Vyakhirev.  A further 20 per cent is held by 
Arngolt Bekker, Stroytrransgaz’s chief executive and a Gazprom director, and three of his relatives hold 
another 12.3 percent between them.…” 
 
Financial Times reporting,  October 28, 2000 
 
“The Federal Securites Commission, the market regulator, yesterday confirmed it had asked for an explanation 
from Gazprom following the publication of an article in Wednesday’s Financial Times on relations between 
the group and Stroytransgaz, a construction company in which present and past senior managers of Gazprom 
and their relatives are significant shareholders. 
 
Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2000 
 
“Revelations that top Gazprom managers and their family members own a big chunk of Gazprom main 
pipeline-building contractor, OAO Stroytransgas, also caused concern among investors last week.  Gazprom 
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Wall Street Journal reporting, October 24, 2000 
Investors holding about 20% of Gazprom complain that Itera has been allowed to gobble up valuable Gazprom 
assets on the cheap.  Take Rospan, a joint venture holding licenses to two fields with reserves of 230 billion 
cubic meters of natural gas and 80 million metric tons of gas condensate.  In 1998, Gazprom decide it couldn’t 
affort to invest in Rospan production and sold its 51% stake to two shell companies founded and owned by 
Itera:  ZAO STI-Sigma and OOO Lanka-Promkomptekt.  Despite Rospan’s rich gas reservers, MR. Vyakhirev 
ordered the stake sold at its nominal price, or par value, of 4,258 roubles -- $284 at the time.  Gazprom’s 
minority shareholders value the lost gas and gas condensate reserves at $345 million. 
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DRAFT Zapsibgazprom dilution
Valuation arrived from placement price valued the whole 
Zapsibgazprom at $7 million
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Wall Street Journal reporting, October 30, 2000 
“the board briefly discussed the erosion of Gazprom’s stake in Zapsibgazprom, A Siberian 
firm whose 700 billion cubic meters of gas reserves are valued at about $600 million.  
Gazprom didn’t take up its rights in a recent share issue, allowing its stake to fall to 37% 
from 51% according to securities commission documents.  Two shell companies of 
unknown ownership acquired 21% of the company during the issue.  The price of the new 
stock issued puts the company’s market capitalization at just $12 million.” 
 
        31Panel B – Continued Reporting of Allegations 
 
One potential way in which sources can get rewarded is with coverage that favors their 











































Financial Times Wall Street Journal
- EBRD makes $250 mn 
loan contingent upon 
transparency regarding 
ITERA
-  Securities regulator  
initiates investigation
Board passs 







Minority shareholders get 
10% of votes to call for audit 
of events.  Board passes 
proposal to appoint current 









        32 Table 2:  Sample of Reported Governance Violations 
 





 (t-10 to t+3) 
Reported governance violation (Date of Troika Dialog Corporate 
Governance Bulletin) 
Aeroflot 12-Aug-99  -0.232  "An  Aeroflot spokesman has said that the company may increase the number of 
outstanding shares by 185%..."  (Aug 12, 1999) 
Alpha Cement  8-Dec-99    “Shareholders will be asked to increase both the authorized share capital and the number of 
outstanding shares. It is proposed to place the new shares with Alpha Cement- related 
structures via pre-arranged subscription.” (Jan 20, 2000)  In the end, 31% of shares were 
placed with designated related party with no disclosed sale price. 
Amursvyaz  28-May-01    As part of a plan for consolidation of regional telecom companies, shareholders were asked 
to approve a swap with Urals Telecom. The terms of the swap are viewed as detrimental to 
the interest of minority investors.  
Avtosvet  30-Dec-99    "On December 30, Avtosvet BoD approved a 50% share capital increase. …. In essence, 
this means a prearranged subscription, allowing a small group of insiders to increase their 
control over the company and barring other shareholders from taking up the new shares. 
The decision was passed by the directors, one day after a proposal to increase the share 
capital by 100% had been voted down at the EGM on December 29." (February 2, 2000) 
AvtoVAZ 23-Jun-00  -0.202  "AvtoVAZ  management has revealed a reorganization program calling to split the 
company into 9 business divisions arranged under a management company…AvtoVAZ 
may simply end up with R1.2 bn ($78mln) in debt, while its assets may be transferred to 
these same subsidiaries.  If this happens then shareholders will be left with little more than 
the parent company debt and the likelihood of the company's subsequent bankruptcy and 
liquidiation should not be ruled out." (June 23, 2000) 
AvtoVAZ 26-Apr-02  -0.081  "AvtoVAZ  preferred shareholders may soon lose their title to dividends worth 10% of the 
company's net profits, without recompense or even a chance to cash out…some 
shareholders visited the AvtoVAZ HQ, 1000 km from Moscow, to study the full AGM 
materials and reported that the unpopular proposition was indeed on the agenda, lumped 
together with other, mostly technical amendments...Why...Possibly because it hopes to 
have all changes, damaging and innocuous, approved en bloc.  This is clearly against the 
law..." ( May 20, 2002.) 
Babayevsky 
Confectionery 
22-Feb-00    "Babayevsky Confectionery 51% shareholder, Inkombank, reported plans for a court 
appeal over the legality of the February 22 EGM which voted to increase the number of 
outstanding shares by 33%. The EGM decision means a 13% decrease in the bank's stake, 
reducing it from a majority to a blocking stake, Inkombank said. …. At present, 27.8 mln 
new shares are to be issued to three obscure outside investors, SeptStroi, Bimish 
Investment and Endora."(March 1, 2000) 
Chernogorneft  17-Jun-99  -0.588  TNK, a holder of Chernogorneft debt, publicly proposes a buyout of Chernogorneft's 
business.  This raises fears that this auction of assets will not be conducted fairly and will 
result in a dilution of existing stakes of shareholders in Chernogorneft including Sidanco 
shareholders who hold a 73% stake.  
FESCO  23-Jun-99  -0.085  "Andrew Fox, a British investor in the Far Eastern Shipping Company, or FESCO - 
Russia's largest shipping concern, with 112 ships and over $350 million annual turnover - 
says he was threatened with imprisonment in early June by Yevgeny Nazdratenko, 
governor of the Primorye region. Fox says Nazdratenko paired his threat with a demand 
that seven percent of the foreign investors' 42 percent stake in FESCO be turned over in 
trust to his administration, and that his man be elected FESCO's chairman of the board. "  
Moscow Times, November 2, 1999 
GAZ  21-Dec-00  -0.311  News of eventual special GM that gave management increased powers to issue up to 3 
billion new shares, against 4.5mn shares outstanding raises concerns about dilution 





 (t-10 to t+3) 
Reported governance violation (Date of Troika Dialog Corporate 
Governance Bulletin) 
Gazprom  12-Aug-99  na  "Allegations that Gazprom would transfer revenues away from the gas producer and quietly 
give ITERA super-profitable contracts intensified last week in the mass media.  Gazprom's 
top managers denounced allegations of doing illicit business with ITERA and enriching 
themselves at the company's cost..."  (August 12, 1999) 
Gazprom  25-Oct-00  0.113  Reports of extensive transactions between Gazprom and companies linked to company 
management including transactions involving ITERA, Rospan and Stroitransgaz.  
Gazprom  11-May-01  -0.047  Stakes of significant vehicle for minority shareholding in Gazprom (UFG) are restricted 
from voting in upcoming AGM, making it very unlikely that most active minority 
shareholder voice on board will not be reelected, and in so doing strengthening position of 
incumbent management. 
Irkutskelectrosvyaz 23-Sep-99    "Although  the  Irkutskelektrosvyaz (ESIR) BoD had recommended skipping dividends for 
1998, which the company finished in the red, ESIR's majority shareholder Svyazinvest 
(38%) pushed through a nominal dividend of R0.01 per preferred share, payable from the 
company's special reserve. A group of preferred shareholders, led by Energia-Invest, is 
now seeking to prove in court that the nominal dividend infringes upon their rights, as 
preferred shareholders would enjoy voting rights at the next AGM if no dividend had been 
paid." (September 23, 1999) 
Kaluganefteproduct 11-Mar-00    "TNK  subsidiary, Kaluganefteproduct, is poised to increase its share capital hundreds fold 
from R4,835 to R6.6 mln. Although the shares will be offered to the general public and 
current shareholders will enjoy their pre-emptive right to buy into the issue, many of the 
latter are likely to be diluted, as few will want to pay R66 ($2.3) for an illiquid share."  
(March 15, 2000) Extra shares are to be swapped for shares in refinery, so essentially 
diluting minority shareholders of these oil product suppliers so that TNK can control the 
refinery.  
KAMAZ  2-Sep-99  -0.172  Company announces plans to pay debt holders through the new issuance of 600 million 
company shares with a par value of 50 rubles, to be distributed among company creditors. 
While the company argued, "this would allow the company to avoid its debt increasing due 
to penalties and fines" minority shareholders which included KKR with a 26% stake and 
EBRD as creditor, raised concerns about dilution. 
Khantymansiiskokr-
telecom 
25-Jul-01  -0.391  As part of a plan for consolidation of regional telecom companies, shareholders asked to 
approve a swap with Urals Telecom.  The terms of the swap are viewed as detrimental to 
the interest of minority investors. 
KrAZ  7-Jun-99    "The AGM voted to approve an additional share issue which will raise $110 mln and 
double KrAZ’s capital. The state, which owns 20% of the company, and small shareholders 
face a 50% dilution, as the new issue will be placed via closed subscription." (July 15, 
1999)  
KrAZ  3-Feb-00    "KrAZ has announced plans to place 15 mln new shares, representing a 53% increase in the 
share capital, with shareholders which control at least 9.8% of existing equity. …. The 
intricate scheme favors shell companies, registered in the Seychelles, Virgin Islands and in 
Cyprus, ostensibly related to Tanako and KrAZ management, which control 90% of KrAZ 
equity capital." (February 9, 2000) 
Kuznetsk Ferrous 
Alloys 
22-May-01    "MDM Bank, the new owner of Kuznetsk Ferrous Alloys (KFA),… (proposed) to float 29 
mln new shares, which would have increased the number of shares outstanding by 600%. 
The shares were to be issued to MDM_controlled structures, diluting the KFA management 
stake from 44% to 6%." (November 12, 2001) 
Lakokraska  7-Sep-00    New share issue at a 31% discount to the current market offer price, designed to dilute 
preferred shareholders, as the program gives them no right of first refusal. Lakokraska has 
never declared, nor paid dividends which means that preferred shares, by default, have had 
voting rights. And it is these votes which seem poised to be diluted by new issue.  





 (t-10 to t+3) 
Reported governance violation (Date of Troika Dialog Corporate 
Governance Bulletin) 
Leningrad Metal Plant   5-Oct-99    "The new share issue aimed to clear outstanding debts was approved by the November 1 
EGM and represents a 114% increase in share capital. This program will dilute existing 
LMZ shareholders by at least 54%." (November 24. 1999) 
Leningrad Metal Plant  3-Apr-00  -0.072  Holder of firm debt forces firm into bankruptcy proceedings and while in proceedings 
initiates a new share emission that dilutes existing controlling shareholder and other 
shareholders. 
Lukoil  8-Jul-99  -0.029  Lukoil announced a distribution of convertible preferred shares as part of takeover of 
Komitek.  Later, on august 26, when share issue was registered with FCSM, it was revealed 
that large owners of Komitek can buy additional convertible preferred shares in Lukoil at 
substantial discount to market.  Troika Dialog reports this price at $.5 per share when 
market price is $7 a share.  (Sept 23, 1999) 
Moscow Refinery  3-May-00    Amendment to charter - instead of paying 10% of net profit to preferred shareholders it was 
approved to pay 10% of nominal value of shares as dividends. 
Mosenergo  9-Feb-99  0.000  Firm announces plan to acquire two power plants from major shareholder UES in exchange 
for the issuance of new shares.  This share issue moves UES from less than 50% to more 
than 50%.  Concerns raised about dilution of existing minority shareholders, value of the 
acquired plants, and increased scope for transactions that could hurt minority shareholder 
interests. 
Nizhnevartovsk Oil 
and Gas Production 
Company 
6-Sep-01    Nizhnevartovsk Oil and Gas Production Company “will now be offering its shareholders 
the opportunity of a swap into a parent company single share, leaving them with no option 
but to exit their companies.”  (Sep. 17, 2001)  Viewed as swap at poor terms. 
Norilsknickel  15-Jun-00  -0.083  Export trading arm Norimet is bought with shares of production subsidiary, Norilsk 
Mining.  Shareholder raise concerns on terms for swap, ("valued 37.9% of NMC at a 
ludicrously small R83.9 mln ($2.9 mln at the exchange rate prevalent in April)" (Jan 25, 
2001)  particularly as trading arm linked with controlling shareholder in Norilsk Nickel, 
and while transfer may have met all legal rules, it was not put to shareholders for approval. 
Norilsknickel  18-Sep-00  -0.240  Announce plans to wind up holding company, Norilsk Nickel, by swapping shares with 
production subsidiary, Norilsk Mining.  "We are negative about the effect of the NMC-
Norimet-Norilsk Nickel consolidation, which would dilute the publicly owned stake in the 
NMC, and particularly about the way in which insiders have steamrollered the restructuring 
through, without consulting outside shareholders."  (Nov 23, 2000) 
Northwesterntelecom 18-Feb-02 -0.055  "At  their Feb 15 meeting, NWT directors voted to sell off the company's 43% stake in 
Delta Telecom (24% of the votes) to an obscure offshore company, TELCO Overseas, for 
just $2.9 mn."  "The latest decision by North Western Telecom to sell off assets below their 
marekt value raises a question mark over the management's commitment to increasing the 
shareholder value and turns a spotlight on the inadequate accountability of the board...  The 
recent deal cannot be anything but detrimental to NWT' outside minority."  (March 4, 
2002) 
Novolipetsk Metal  27-Jan-99    Management attempted hostile take over through $100m share issue in closed subscription 
to large shareholders.  “CCM which manages 29% of Novolipetsk share capital, has said 
that Novolipetsk management is using Russia’s crises as an excuse to “hijack the business” 
and disenfranchise minority shareholders.”  (February 10, 1999). 
Novolipetsk  Metal  13-Jul-00    Management refused to allow the large shareholder access to financial information 
pertaining to the sale of its business unit, the Stinol factory. 
Noyabrskneftegaz 1-Dec-98    Sibneft  consolidated daughter companies (Noyabrskneftegaz and 
Noyabrsknetegasgeophysika) using the transfer to a single share scheme at what are viewed 
as unfair swap ratios. 
Noyabrskneftegaz  27-Dec-00    Sibneft asks subsidiary Noyabrskneftegaz for further consolidation through reverse share 
split. 





 (t-10 to t+3) 
Reported governance violation (Date of Troika Dialog Corporate 
Governance Bulletin) 
Orenburgneft  28-Apr-00    "YUKOS, which owns at least 16% (or 31%, according to some accounts) of this Onaco 
subsidiary, claims that the company did not send it an AGM notice (and called) …for a 
revision of the authorized capital… (May 25, 2000) 
Petmol Dairy  1-Feb-00    "Two  Petmol  shareholders, … sold a 47% stake in Roska Dairy, … to three outside 
individual investors without allowing its fellow shareholders to exercise their right of first 
refusal. Even worse, it flouted the UPD articles of incorporation, signed in November 
1999, which stipulated that equity contributions could not be disposed of for at least five 
years." (March 15, 2000) 
Purneftegaz  6-Jul-01  0.137  "(Purneftegaz) EGM approved the sale to Rosneft of a total of 18 mln tons of crude at an 
average price of $5 /bbl ($36.5/ton) which barely covers Purneftegaz' production costs. 
...Purneftegaz shareholders also agreed to transfer $273 million worth of equipment to the 
holding company, to repay R 8.2 bn ($273 mln) in debt...Shareholders were never told 
what the equipment being transferred was.  Yes, and is it really worth only $273 mln?"  
(August 3, 2001) 
Purneftegaz  18-Feb-02  -0.389  "Rosneft has been a mediocre parent to Purneftegaz:  last year it snatched away its value-
creating assets and is now poised to dilute dissenting shareholders by forcing them to buy 
stock of empty subsidiaries at a premium to their net value."  (March 4, 2002) 
Sakhalinmorneft 14-Mar-00  -0.297  "Rosneft  subsidiary Sakhalinmorneftegaz will hold an AGM on April 26.   Shareholders 
will … be asked to waive their statutory right to have their stakes redeemed by a 
shareholder which has accumulated more than 30% of the company's equity...The mere fact 
of waiving their major right, combined with the general lack of transparency, should be 
enough to put small shareholders, which control at least 10% of the company, on their 
guard."  (April 12, 2000) 
Sakhaneftegaz  16-Feb-00    It is proposed to place 3 mln new shares with the Sakha government, which increases its 
control up to 59%, to reimburse it for R26.6 mln ($930,000) in capital investment. The 
implied market capitalization is therefore only $3.99 mln, with the shares priced at a 30% 
discount to their current market value ($1)… Shareholders will vote by correspondence, 
which increases the scope for potential corporate governance abuse. (March 15, 2000) 
Samaraneftegas  24-Feb-99    “Samaraneftegaz has announced plans to issue 67,490.280 additional common share. The 
issue represents a 238% increase in SNGs charter capital (Threat:  capital dilution).  The 
company proposed to place the issue via closed subscription…Shareholders will be asked 
to approve all Samaraneftegas BoD decisions made through 1997 and 1998 …   
Furthermore, Samaraneftegas directors  believe that it will do no harm to get carte blanche 
for future restructuring deals and ask shareholders to authorize any spin-offs and asset 
stripping that the BoD may at any time consider appropriate.  They will therefore ask 
shareholder to okay future deals “in bulk.” (February 24, 1999) “On March 23, a bailiff 
opened the Samaraneftegaz EGM by reading out a court ruling barring four companies … 
from voting their shares.  By ”excommunicating” its four major critics Yukos secure 95.7% 
of votes. (March 24, 1999) 
Samotlorneftegaz  6-Sep-01    “will now be offering its shareholders the opportunity of a swap into a parent company 
single share, leaving them with no option but to exit their companies.”  (Sep. 17, 2001)  
Viewed as swap at poor terms. 
Sberbank  27-Dec-00  -0.105  "On December 27, Sberbank BoD reportedly discussed 1999 financial results and a new 
share issue program…if the bank decides to fill in the authorized cap, by issuing a further 
4.99 mln share, then this will lead to a 36% increase in the voting shares…we assess the 




22-Jun-99    SIBUR pushed through the reorganization of the Sibneftegazpererabotka, whereby its 
crown jewels (ten gas refineries) were transferred to SIBUR-Tyumen and the parent 
company was left with debt and little else. 





 (t-10 to t+3) 
Reported governance violation (Date of Troika Dialog Corporate 
Governance Bulletin) 
SibUr-Neftekhim  3-Aug-00    CEO of the company transfered shares he controls in two transactions to allies of 
prominent investor, giving them enough voting shares to put through transactions that 
allow stripping out of assets. 
Slavneftmegion 6-Jul-00  -0.017 "TNK, a 12.8% shareholder in Slavneft, got no seat on the the new board…Ahead of the 
Slavneft AGM, the adament Slavneft won a court indictment, barring TNK from voting on 
its stake."  July 6, 2000 
Surgutneftegas 24-Jan-00  -0.149  "In  early  January Surgutneftegaz crafted a consolidation program, which, if approved by 
the EGM called for February 10 would increase management's holding of voting share to 
40% and give it control over "treasury stock" (33%).  Outside shareholders would see their 
combined stake decline from 31% to less than 25%, less than a blocking minority...There 
are several reasons for concern. (1) The swap rates remain unknown...(2) ...there may be no 
way to verify interested-party transaction requirements...(3) The company has yet to 
confirm that preferred shareholders will be allowed to vote...(4)... the shares which the 
company currently owns in the subidiary, rather than being cancelled...management will 
have the proxy to vote them."  Feb 2, 2000 
TNK-Nyagan  6-Sep-01    TNK initiated reverse share split 
Tomsk Refinery  24-Jun-99    The decision of a 25% dilution was accompanied by a generous proposal from the BoD to 
all existing shareholders to take up the new shares at R848 ($35) each and a dubious offer 
to buy shares from dissenting shareholders at R21 ($0.86) per share. 
Tomskneft  24-Feb-99    Tomskneft… will hold an EGM… The agenda of the meeting includes the approval of a 
41% increase in of Tomskneft share capital, and the authorization of 82 mln new shares 
issued to five Yukos-affialted offshore companies… It is also proposed that all structural 
changes made by the BoD from 1997 until the EGM be approved i.e. the creation of 32 
daughter companies and the transfer of $159 mln in Tomskneft assets to subsidiaries. 
Shareholders will be asked to vote on amendments to the charter…(that) would give the 
BoD unbridled powers, leaving shareholders defenseless.(March 10, 1999)  “When 
shareholders arrived that morning to the address announced in the EGM notice, they 
discovered a note, on a sheet of paper stuck to the wall, saying that the meeting would take 
place at a different location, the now well-known town of Mosalsk (a 2-3 hour drive from 
Moscow).  By doing so YUKOS, which had so far been selective in barring shareholders 
from general meetings ( keep the ‘undesirables’ out and let ‘good old boys’ in), has 
displayed unusual impartiality by leaving all outside shareholders out of the action…” 
(June 17, 1999) 
Transneft  8-Jul-99    "At the Transneft AGM, the government, which owns 100% of voting stock, voted to slash 
preferred dividends to R0.5 (compared with R56.6 in 1997). Transneft still owes about 
R133.6 mln ($5.5 mln) in 1997 preferred dividends. Preferred shareholders have not 
received any dividends, but because dividends were announced, they could not vote at the 
AGM. The state has pushed through an amendment whereby the company, instead of 10% 
of net profit, will pay fixed preferred dividends of only R0.5." July 8, 1999 
Tulanefteproduct  8-Dec-99    "Tulanefteproduct, a Transnefteproduct subsidiary, has announced plans to increase its 
share capital by 59% via additional share issue. It is proposed to place the new shares with 
insiders via closed subscription. The proposal will be discussed at the EGM, scheduled for 
January 8." (December 8, 1999) 
Tyumenneftegaz  6-Sep-01    “will now be offering its shareholders the opportunity of a swap into a parent company 
single share, leaving them with no option but to exit their companies.”  (Sep. 17, 2001)  
Viewed as swap at poor terms. 
UES  5-Apr-00  -0.058  UES proposes restructuring plan for industry that minority shareholders contend opens up 
ample opportunities for self-dealing by company insiders. 
Ust-llimsk Timber 
Concern 
27-Aug-01    A prominent investor in Rospom (RusAl) forces production subsidiary (Ulsk Timber) into 
bankruptcy and in process transfers assets to themselves. 





 (t-10 to t+3) 
Reported governance violation (Date of Troika Dialog Corporate 
Governance Bulletin) 
Viksunsk Pipe  26-Jan-99    Dilution is proposed and the terms of share redemption are very poor: redemption price 4 
times lower than the price of new shares. 
Yuganskneftegaz  24-Mar-99    “Approval of oil sales by YFGA to Yukos-contrrolled entities at R250 per ton for the next 
three years.  Retroactive approval of the establishment of 59 daughter companies and 
prospective approval of 60 more subsidiaries to be created over the next three years.   
Transfer of $1bn in assets from the parent company to 119 subsidiaries.  Shareholders that 
do not attend the meeting or vote against the proposals, will be bought out for as little as 
R7.5 per share(33 cents), which values Yuganskneftegaz’s oil reserves at just $0.0003 per 
barrel. (March 24, 1999) 
        38Table 3:  Outcomes of Governance Violations 
 




Date of event 
resolution 
Outcome description  Outcome:  
2= full recovery 
1=partial redress 
0=no redress 
Aeroflot  12-Aug-99    Share increase introduced.  0 
Alpha Cement  8-Dec-99    Goes through.  0 
Amursvyaz 28-May-01    Goes  through.  0 
Avtosvet 30-Dec-99    Goes  through.  0 
AvtoVAZ 23-Jun-00    Reorganization  introduced.  0 
AvtoVAZ  26-Apr-02  14-Mar-03  Reverted on 3/14/2003, by court  2 
Babayevsky 
Confectionery 
22-Feb-00   Goes  through.  0 
Chernogorneft  17-Jun-99  22-Dec-00  TNK got control but later sold back to BP in exchange 
for shares. 
1 
FESCO 23-Jun-99    Foreign  shareholders lose representation.  0 
GAZ  21-Dec-00  no exercise of 
the power to 
issue new 
shares 
Provision passed at AGM.  But no exercise of this 
power to issue new shares. 
1 
Gazprom  12-Aug-99    No action to redress significant self-dealing, even 
suggestions that intensify in this period. 
0 
Gazprom 25-Oct-00  28-Oct-00  Significant  movement to redress transactions including 
removal of management in spring 2001, recovery of 
some assets transferred to ITERA. 
2 
Gazprom  11-May-01  6-Jun-2001  CEO replaced in advance of AGM, followed by removal 
of restriction on UFG shares, with Fyodorov gaining 
seat at AGM. 
2 
Irkutskelectrosvyaz 23-Sep-99  1-Mar-00  On  March  1, 2000, Irkutsk Region arbiters ruled the 
Irkutskelectrosvyaz EGM decision to announce 1998 
preferred dividends illegal. 
2 
Kaluganefteproduct 11-Mar-00    Goes  through.  0 
KAMAZ 2-Sep-99  6-Apr-00  Share  issue  goes through. EBRD challenges case, 
initiating lawsuits, but to no avail until April 6, when 
come to agreement whereby transform half of debt into 
equity (4-5%) and remaining half into rescheduled debt 




25-Jul-01    Original proposed swap ratio goes through.  0 
KrAZ 7-Jun-99    Goes  through.  0 
KrAZ  3-Feb-00  19-Feb-00  Shareholders declined the agenda of EGM.  2 
Kuznetsk Ferrous 
Alloys 
22-May-01  26-oct-2001  On October 26, 2001 FCSM refused to register new 
issue 
2 
Lakokraska 7-Sep-00    Goes  through.  0 
Leningrad Metal Plant   5-Oct-99    Goes through.  0 




Date of event 
resolution 
Outcome description  Outcome:  
2= full recovery 
1=partial redress 
0=no redress 
Leningrad Metal Plant  3-Apr-00    On July 10, 2000 Federal Arbitrage ruled in favor of 
Interros, recognizing the legitimity of share issue by 
creditor (Interros) during bancruptcy procedure of 
Leningrad Metal Plant. 
0 
Lukoil 8-Jul-99    Goes  through.  0 
Moscow Refinery  3-May-00    Goes through.  0 
Mosenergo 9-Feb-99    Goes  through.  0 
Nizhnevartovsk Oil and 
Gas Production 
Company 
6-Sep-01   Goes  through.  0 
Norilsknickel 15-Jun-00    Goes  through.  0 
Norilsknickel 18-Sep-00    Protracted  battle ensues led by Russian securities 
agency that pursues multiple court challenges to 
transaction.   
0 
Northwesterntelecom 18-Feb-02    Not  reversed.  0 
Novolipetsk Metal  27-Jan-99    Goes through.  0 
Novolipetsk Metal  13-Jul-00    Goes through.  0 
Noyabrskneftegaz 1-Dec-98    Goes  through.  0 
Noyabrskneftegaz 27-Dec-00    Goes  through.  0 
Orenburgneft 28-Apr-00    Goes  through.  0 
Petmol Dairy  1-Feb-00    Goes through.  0 
Purneftegaz 6-Jul-01    Goes  through.  0 
Purneftegaz 18-Feb-02    Goes  through.  0 
RAO UES  5-Apr-00  20-Jun-01  Reorganization plan radically altered in face of protests 
and publicity. 
1 
Sakhalinmorneft 14-Mar-00    Goes  through.  0 
Sakhaneftegaz 16-Feb-00    Goes  through.  0 
Samaraneftegas 24-Feb-99    Goes  through.  0 
Samotlorneftegaz 6-Sep-01    Goes  through.  0 
Sberbank  27-Dec-00  27-Jun-01  dilutive issues goes through, but minorities get board 
seat and later law passed limiting future issues. 
1 
Sibneftegazpererabotka 22-Jun-99    Goes  through.  0 
SibUr-Neftekhim 3-Aug-00    Goes  through.  0 
Slavneftmegion 6-Jul-00    blocked  0 
Surgutneftegas 24-Jan-00    Goes  through.  0 
TNK-Nyagan 6-Sep-01    Goes  through.  0 
Tomsk Refinery  24-Jun-99  4-Oct-1999  On October 4, 1999 FCSM cancelled the new issue  2 
Tomskneft 24-Feb-99  17-Jan-00  On  January 17, 2000 the FCSM suspended the 
Tomskneft share issue prospectus. 
2 
Transneft  8-Jul-99  3-July 3-2000  On July 3, 2000 GM approved to pay dividends for 
1997 
1 




Date of event 
resolution 
Outcome description  Outcome:  
2= full recovery 
1=partial redress 
0=no redress 
Tulanefteproduct 8-Dec-99    Goes  through.  0 
Tyumenneftegaz 6-Sep-01    Goes  through.  0 
Ust-llimsk Timber 
Concern 
27-Aug-01  23-Nov-01  The bankruptcy proceedings were ceased and assets was 
returned to Rospom 
1 
Viksunsk Pipe  26-Jan-99  21-June-1999  Shareholders applied to NAUFOR that helped them to 
fight. FCSM indicated that it supports their efforts. The 
agreement was achieved between shareholders and 
managers 
1 
Yuganskneftegaz 24-Mar-99  11-Aug-99  Conflict  between FCSM and Yukos. FCSM stop trading 
of Yukos shares on RTS and Yukos was forced to 
switch to another stock exchange. Yukos doubled the 
swap ratio. 
1 
        41 Table 4:  News Coverage of Governance Violations and Firms 
 
 
  # of articles in English newspapers: 
WSJ and Financial Times 
# of articles in Russian newspapers: 














































Aeroflot  12-Aug-99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  11  97 
Alpha  Cement  8-Dec-99  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  2 
Amursvyaz  28-May-01 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2  0  0 
Avtosvet  30-Dec-99 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1  0  0 
AvtoVAZ  23-Jun-00  0 0 0 0 3 3 6 6  5  92 
AvtoVAZ  26-Apr-02 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1  5  92 
Babayevsky 
Confectionery 
22-Feb-00  0 0 0 0 4 5 1 0  0  6 
Chernogorneft  17-Jun-99  1 5  22  18  3 4  16  15  0  5 
FESCO  23-Jun-99  0 0 0 0 2 3 1 0  0  8 
GAZ  21-Dec-00 0 1 1 0 2 5 4 1  5  35 
Gazprom  12-Aug-99 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 133 381 
Gazprom  25-Oct-00 12  16  18  14  5 6 5 4 133 381 
Gazprom  11-May-01 5 7 4 2  18  21  3 0 133 381 
Irkutskelectrosvyaz  23-Sep-99  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Kaluganefteproduct  11-Mar-00 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1  0  0 




0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 
0 0 
KrAZ  7-Jun-99  1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0  1  21 
KrAZ  3-Feb-00  0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0  1  21 
Kuznetsk Ferrous 
Alloys 
22-May-01 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1  0  0 
Lakokraska  7-Sep-00  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Leningrad  Metal  Plant    5-Oct-99  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1  0  4 
Leningrad  Metal  Plant  3-Apr-00  0 0 0 0 2 4 6 4  0  3 
Lukoil  8-Jul-99  0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0  75  175 
Moscow  Refinery  3-May-00  0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0  0  11 
Mosenergo  9-Feb-99  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  8  39 
Nizhnevartovsk Oil and 
Gas Production  
6-Sep-01  0 0 0 0 0 1 7 6  0  0 
Norilskii  Nickel  15-Jun-00  0 0 3 3 5 5 8 8  10  45 
Norilskii  Nickel  18-Sep-00  7 8 8 7  16  18  17  15 10  45 
North  Western  Telecom  18-Feb-02  0 0 0 0 2 3 4 3  0  0 
Novolipetsk  Metal  27-Jan-99  0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0  2  25 
Novolipetsk  Metal  13-Jul-00  0 0 0 0 1 1 7 7  2  25 
Noyabrskneftegaz  1-Dec-98  0 0 0 0 2 3 1 0  2  15 
Noyabrskneftegaz  27-Dec-00 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1  2  15 
Orenburgneft  28-Apr-00 0 0 0 0 8  10  3 1  0  4 
Petmol  Dairy  1-Feb-00  0 0 0 0 0 2 4 2  0  4 
Purneftegaz  6-Jul-01  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1  0  5 
Purneftegaz  18-Feb-02  0 0 0 0 1 3 3 1  0  5 
RAO  UES  5-Apr-00  2  5  15 15 12 16 38 34  38  230 
Sakhaneftegaz  16-Feb-00  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  1 
Samaraneftegas  24-Feb-99  2 3 6 5 0 1 3 2  1  6 
Samotlorneftegaz 6-Sep-01  0 0 0 0 1 3 5 3  0  0 
Sberbank  27-Dec-00 3 3 8 8 1 3  24  22  6  212 
Sibneftegazpererabot  22-Jun-99  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
SibUr-Neftekhim 3-Aug-00  0 0 0 0 3 5 3 1  0  0 
Skhalinmorneft  14-Mar-00 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0  0  8 
Slavneft  6-Jul-00  1 1 0 0 5 6 1 0  2  14 
Surgutneftegas  24-Jan-00  5 5 0 0  10  12  8 6  1  41 
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  # of articles in English newspapers: 
WSJ and Financial Times 
# of articles in Russian newspapers: 














































TNK-Nyagan  6-Sep-01  0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0  0  0 
Tomsk  Refinery  24-Jun-99  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Tomskneft  24-Feb-99  2 4 7 5 1 1 3 3  3  5 
Transneft  8-Jul-99  0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0  3  7 
Tulanefteproduct 8-Dec-99  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1  0  0 
Tyumenneftegaz  6-Sep-01  0 0 0 0 1 2 2 1  0  1 
Ust-llimsk  Timber    27-Aug-01 0 0 0 0 1 5 5 1  0  2 
Viksunsk  Pipe  26-Jan-99  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Yuganskneftegaz 24-Mar-99 3 3 3 3 1 1 3 3  0  10 




        43Table 5: Control Variables 
 
Number of joint ventures is the sum of the number of existing joint ventures with foreign companies and the 
ones that are completed in the year following the revelation of the corporate governance violation.  Foreign 
ownership is the proportion of stock held by foreign investors. EBRD is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
EBRD has financed the company.  Hermitage is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Hermitage fund owned a 
stake in the company six months prior to the revelation of the governance violation.   
 



















stake in company 
Aeroflot 12-Aug-99  0  0.2  0  0 
Alpha Cement  8-Dec-99  0  0.5  0  0 
Amursvyaz 28-May-01  0  0  0  0 
Avtosvet 30-Dec-99  0  0.216  0  0 
AvtoVAZ 23-Jun-00  3  0  0  0 
AvtoVAZ 26-Apr-02  3  0  1  0 
Babayevsky Confectionery  22-Feb-00  0  0  0  0 
Chernogorneft 17-Jun-99  0  0.1842  1  0 
FESCO 23-Jun-99  1  0.4  1  0 
GAZ 21-Dec-00  2  0.4  1  0 
Gazprom 12-Aug-99  3  0.058  0  1 
Gazprom 25-Oct-00  3  0.1  0  1 
Gazprom 11-May-01  3  0.11  0  1 
Irkutskelectrosvyaz 23-Sep-99  0 0.026  0  0 
Kaluganefteproduct 11-Mar-00  0  0  0  0 
KamAZ 2-Sep-99  0  0.26  1  0 
Khantymansiiskokrtelecom 25-Jul-01  0  0.065  0  0 
KrAZ 7-Jun-99  0  0.14  0  0 
KrAZ 3-Feb-00  0  0.14  0  0 
Kuznetsk Ferrous Alloys  22-May-01  0  0  0  0 
Lakokraska 7-Sep-00  0  0  0  0 
Leningrad Metal Plant   5-Oct-99  0  0.1  0  0 
Leningrad Metal Plant  3-Apr-00  0  0.1472  0  0 
Lukoil 8-Jul-99  2  0.372  0  1 
Moscow Refinery  3-May-00  0  0  0  0 
Mosenergo 9-Feb-99  0  0.35  1  1 
Nizhnevartovsk Oil and Gas 
Production  
6-Sep-01 0  0  0  0 
Norilskii Nickel  15-Jun-00  1  0.2  0  1 
Norilskii Nickel  18-Sep-00  1  0.2  0  1 
North Western Telecom  18-Feb-02  0  0.2864  0  0 
Novolipetsk Metal  27-Jan-99  0  0.4  0  0 
Novolipetsk Metal  13-Jul-00  0  0.4  0  0 
Noyabrskneftegaz 1-Dec-98  0  0  0  0 
Noyabrskneftegaz 27-Dec-00  0  0  0  0 
Orenburgneft 28-Apr-00  1  0  0  0 
Petmol Dairy  1-Feb-00  1  0.37  0  0 
Purneftegaz 6-Jul-01  0  0.404  0  0 
Purneftegaz 18-Feb-02  0  0.404  0  0 
RAO UES  5-Apr-00  0  0.33  0  1 
Sakhaneftegaz 16-Feb-00  0  0  0  0 
Samaraneftegas 24-Feb-99  0  0.15  0  0 
Samotlorneftegaz 6-Sep-01  0  0  0  0 
Sberbank 27-Dec-00  1  0.119  1  1 
Sibneftegazpererabotka 22-Jun-99  0  0  0  0 
SibUr-Neftekhim 3-Aug-00  0  0  0  0 
Skhalinmorneft 14-Mar-00  2  0.1063  1  0 



















stake in company 
Slavneft 6-Jul-00  2  0.126  0  0 
Surgutneftegas 24-Jan-00  0  0.31  0  1 
TNK-Nyagan 6-Sep-01  0  0  0  0 
Tomsk Refinery  24-Jun-99  0  0  0  0 
Tomskneft 24-Feb-99  0  0.2  0  0 
Transneft 8-Jul-99  1  0  1  0 
Tulanefteproduct 8-Dec-99  0 0  0 0 
Tyumenneftegaz 6-Sep-01  0 0  0 0 
Ust-llimsk Timber   27-Aug-01  0  0  0  0 
Viksunsk Pipe  26-Jan-99  0  0  0  0 
Yuganskneftegaz 24-Mar-99 0  0.15  0 0 
Average   0.53  0.139  0.16  0.18 
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Table 6:  Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum Number 
of obs. 
Announcement effect  -0.14  0.16  -0.59  0.14  24 
Newsworthiness 10.38  32.20  0  133  57 
Number of articles highlighting violation           
in the Financial Times  0.70  1.84  0  11  57 
in the Wall Street Journal  0.38  0.98  0  5  57 
in the FT and WSJ  1.09  2.75  0  16  57 
Ownership, debt and JV           
Dummy for Hermitage Funds ownership  0.18  0.38  0  1  57 
Foreign share  0.14  0.15  0  0.5  57 
Dummy for EBRD stake  0.16  0.37  0  1  57 
Number of JV  0.53  0.96  0  3  57 
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In all the regressions in Panel A but the last one (and all the regressions in panel B) the dependent 
variable is a variable equal to 0 if the corporate governance violation was not readdressed at all, 1 if 
partially readdressed and 2 - seriously addressed (e.g. change in CEO, change in charter, change in 
number of independent board members, change in national law) and the estimated are obtained using 
an ordered logit.  In column VI of panel A we club outcome 1 and 2 and we run a simple logit. 
Foreign ownership is the proportion of stock held by foreign investors. EBRD is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the EBRD has financed the company. Number of joint ventures is the number of existing 
joint ventures with foreign companies and the ones that are completed in the year following the 
revelation of the corporate governance violation.  All the measures of coverage are the number of 
articles published in the mentioned newspapers in the specified window. Standard errors are reported 
in brackets, * means 10% significant, ** 5% and ***  1%.  
 
Panel 7A: Coverage in different windows  
 I    II    III    IV   V   VI   
Foreign ownership (%)  -3.108   -5.885 *  -4.888 *  -4.356    -4.591 *  -12.397 *** 
 (2.35)   (3.14)   (2.86)   (2.70)    (2.75)   (4.50)  
EBRD as an investor dummy   1.294 *  1.722 **  1.827 **  0.869    0.916   3.842 ** 
 (0.72)   (0.81)   (0.80)   (0.77)    (0.78)   (1.59)  
Number of Joint Ventures  0.293   -0.04   -0.034   0.332    0.309   -0.922  
 (0.31)   (0.36)   (0.36)   (0.32)    (0.32)   (0.56)  
# of articles in FT and WSJ                
Date – 1month , Date + 2months    0.426 **          0.642 ** 
    (0.17)           (0.28)  
Date – 1month , Date + 1month     0.429 **           
        (0.19)         
Date +2months , Date + 6months       0.168  **    
       (0.07)      
Date +1month , Date + 6months           0.15 **  
        (0.06)   
Number of observations  57   57   57   57   57   57  
 
Panel 7B:  Different types of coverage  
  I   II    III 
Foreign ownership (%)  -5.885  *  -5.697  *  -6.689 ** 
 (3.14)    (3.18)    (3.38) 
EBRD as an investor dummy   1.722  **  1.604  *  2.028 ** 
 (0.81)    (0.88)    (0.89) 
Number of Joint Ventures  -0.04   0.018   -0.023 
 -0.365  (0.40) (0.37) 
# of articles in FT and WSJ            
Date – 1month , Date + 2months  0.426  **  0.477  **  
 (0.17)    (0.24)     
# of articles in FT         0.087 
Date – 1month , Date + 2months      (0.35) 
      
# of articles in WSJ      1.081 * 
Date – 1month , Date + 2months      (0.65) 
      
# of articles in Russian newspapers    -0.036     
Date – 1month , Date + 2months    (0.11)   
    
Number of observations  57  57  57
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Panel 7C:  Audience vs. Credibility   
   I  II  III 
Foreign ownership (%)  -3.217  -4.284  -6.435* 
 (2.417)  (2.776)  (3.554) 
Ebrd as an investor dummy  1.487**  1.658**  1.603** 
 (0.750)  (0.784)  (0.892) 
Number of Joint Ventures  0.153  0.112  0.087 
 (0.343)  (0.353)  (0.412) 
Number of articles in Vedemosti  0.188  0.103  -0.167 
Date – 1month , Date + 2months  (0.180)  (0.193)  (0.236) 
Number of articles in other Russian papers    0.114  0.004 
Date – 1month , Date + 2months    (0.097)  (0.123) 
Number of articles in WSJ and FT      0.501** 
Date – 1month , Date + 2months      (0.243) 
     
N 57  57  57 
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Table 8: The Determinants of Press Coverage 
 
In all the regressions the dependent variable is a measures of coverage (number of articles published in the 
mentioned newspapers in the specified window). Newsworthiness is measured as the number of references to a 
company in the 6 month period from January to end of June 1998.  Foreign ownership is the proportion of 
stock held by foreign investors. Hermitage is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Hermitage fund owned a stake 
in the company six months prior to the alleged corporate violation being revealed.  The announcement excess 
return is the cumulative excess return between t-10 to t+3 days around the day of the first revelation of the 
corporate governance violation.  All the estimates are obtained by OLS. Standard errors are reported in 
brackets, * means 10% significant, ** 5% and *** 1%.  
 
Panel A: Whole sample  
  # of articles in 
 
# of articles in FT and WSJ between 
FT between  WSJ between 
 Date–1month  , 
Date+2 months 










Newsworthiness 0.05  *** 0.027  **  0.02 **  -0.01  -0.015  0.018 **  0.01 ** 
 (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)  (0.008)   (0.004)  
Foreign ownership, %  1.403   -0.38    -0.458   -1.24  -1.307  -0.511   0.122  
 (2.07)    (2.01)    (1.58)   (3.64)   (2.97)  (1.37)   (0.73)  
Hermitage dummy     2.88  ***  2.042  ***  7.406  ***  6.571 *** 1.92  ***  0.952  *** 
     (0.96)   (0.75)   (1.73)   (1.41)  (0.65)   (0.35)  
Constant 0.38    0.301    0.23    0.63  0.56  0.22    0.08   
 (0.42)    (0.39)    (0.31)    (0.71)  (0.58)  (0.27)    (0.14)   
Observations  57   57   57   57   57  57   57  
R-squared  0.33   0.43   0.39   0.35   0.36  0.41   0.40  
F-test:  
  Newsworthiness=0 
  Hermitage dummy=0 
25.77 19.29  16.48    13.70  14.45  18.07  16.95 
 
 
Panel B: Sample with reliable stock prices  
  # of articles in 
 
# of articles in FT and WSJ between 
FT between  WSJ between 
 Date–1month  , 
Date+2 months 










Announcement returns  -2.83   -1.72 1.19 -11.47 -8.55 -0.61    -1.11   
 (4.25)   (3.93)   (3.23)  (7.84)   (6.51) (2.78)    (1.39)   
Newsworthiness 0.07***  0.05 **  0.03 * 0.03 0.02 0.03  **  0.019  ** 
 (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)  (0.03)   (0.03) (0.01)    (0.007)   
Foreign ownership, %  -2.22   -4.65   -4.51  -4.17 -4.04 -4.05    -0.59   
 (5.24)   (4.94)   (4.06)  (9.84)   (8.17) (3.49)    (1.74)   
Hermitage dummy      2.95 **  2.22 * 7.25 **  6.52 **  1.94 *  1.00 * 
     (1.37)   (1.13)   (2.74)   (2.27) (0.97)    (0.48)   
Constant 0.87   0.68   1.11   -1   -0.57 0.79    -0.11   
 (1.68)   (1.54)   (1.26)   (3.07)   (2.55) (1.09)    (0.54)   
Observations 23   23   23   23   23 23    23   
R-squared 0.5   0.6   0.55   0.45   0.45 0.56    0.6   
F-test:  
  Newsworthiness=0 
  Hermitage dummy=0 
16.33 
12.01 8.35  7.09 6.85  9.74  12.68 
 
 
        49Table 9:  The IV Estimates 
 
 
The dependent variable is a variable equal to 0 if the corporate governance violation was not 
readdressed at all, 1 if partially readdressed and 2 seriously addressed (e.g. change in CEO, change in charter, 
change in number of independent board members, change in national law). Foreign ownership is the 
proportion of stock held by foreign investors. EBRD is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the EBRD has financed 
the company. Number of joint ventures is the number of existing joint ventures with foreign companies and the 
ones that are completed in the year following the revelation of the corporate governance violation.  Coverage 
are the number of articles published in FT and WSJ between one month before the revelation of the corporate 
governance violation and two months after. Column I is estimated by OLS. Column II by IV, where the 
instruments for coverage are newsworthiness (number of references to a in the 6 month period from January to 
end of June 1998)  and the Hermitage dummy. Standard errors are reported in brackets, * -  means 10% 
significant, **- 5% and *** - 1%.   
 
 
  I    II   
Foreign ownership, %  -1.16  *  -1.13 * 
 (0.59)    (0.60)   
EBRD as an investor dummy   0.476  *  0.47 * 
 (0.23)    (0.24)   
# of articles in FT and WSJ between        
Date – 1month , Date + 2months  0.111  ***  0.097 * 
 (0.03)    (0.04)   
Constant 0.4  ***  0.412  *** 
  (0.12)    (0.12)  
Number of observations  57    57  




        50Table 10:  Who Acts to Redress Reported Governance Violations? 
 
This table classifies the 17 (partially) successful outcomes based on the main mechanism 
involved in the resolution.  
 
  Intervention by government actors  Private sector actors    
Mechanisms  Intervention of  
regulators/courts 
Political intervention  Company relents 
when faced with 
significant opposition 
Company relents  Total 
 AvtoVAZ  Gazprom  KAMAZ  Chernogorneft   
 Irkutskelectrosvyaz  RAO  UES  KrAZ  GAZ   
  Kuznetsk Ferrous Alloys  Sberbank  Ust-Ilimsk Timber   Gazprom   
  Tomsk Refinery    Viksunsk Pipe  Transneft   
 Tomskneft         
  Yuganskneftegaz        
Number of cases  6 3  4  4  17 
Percentage of 
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